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Abstract
The Dynamical Hypothesis [22] is gathering force within cognitive science
and within biology. Evolutionary, developmental and learning processes can
all be characterised by the DH and any models should try to account for this
property. The processes differ in terms of their operational time-scale and the
resources each has to hand. Evolution sets the parameters for the dynamical
interactions in development and learning. Could all three processes possibly
be regarded as a nested hierarchy sharing the same dynamical properties? We
ask this question and argue that a DH understanding of the potential evolution
of cognitive systems could inform subsequent modelling.
1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to provide a brief survey of the role of the "Dynamical
Hypothesis" (DH) [22] within cognitive science at a number of different levels of
explanation.  We specifically want to make the following main points:
· The DH potentially unifies explanations of cognition at the evolutionary,
developmental, and learning  levels;
· Evolutionary constraints on cognition need to be seen as "running through"
development and learning, but effects at the other levels can influence evolution;
· We need to model and simulate the above in order to support theory.
First, we shall make some general epistemological points to focus our argument.
Science is about discovering the order of the universe and explaining the causes
and functions of that order. We observe order in our everyday dealings with the
universe and such observations form the foundation of our folk theories.  Scientific
methods enable scientists to uncover fundamental natural kinds of the universe and
understand how they interact in order to produce the higher level phenomena that
interest us.
The behavioural and cognitive sciences are interested in explaining how it is that
organisms regularly mediate between input and output. Hendriks-Jansen [10] has
recently claimed that artificial intelligence (AI) has failed to truly determine natural
kinds that provide illuminating explanations.  Instead AI has embarked upon an
exercise in mimicking input-output relations under the assumptions of a Universal
Turing Machine that can implement input-output relations in any number of ways.
Thus AI only provides us with formal task descriptions of what is to be explained.  If
we really want to understand Nature and the actual middle terms she employs we
need a better approach than this. We believe this is true of much cognitive science.
Hendriks-Jansen further argued that we need to take an evolutionary perspective
because such approaches will better inform our natural history of the original order of
interest.  In the next section we analyse recent attempts to apply evolutionary
thinking to cognition.  This will lead us to advocate a different approach to
evolutionary theorising in the cognitive sciences, one that is firmly grounded within
the DH.
2. Evolutionary Psychology (EP)
Recently some psychologists [2] have examined our complex psychological
phenotype in terms of natural selection [6].  For a trait to be naturally selected it
needs to provide a solution to a contingent adaptive problem, which needs to be fairly
long term and stable. Cosmides and Tooby [5] suggest that the Pleistocene epoch was
such an Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA).  During the EEA various
discretely organised cognitive mechanisms were selected that solved these putative
problems.  For example, Cosmides [4] has demonstrated that people perform much
better on the Wason Selection Task when the task is about seeking out violations of
social contracts than in its original abstract form.  Cosmides argues this is because
finding cheats within a social system would have been a contingent ancestral problem
and the species has evolved a specific module to deal with this.  The fact that people
find it hard to transfer their reasoning ability to the abstract task with the same
underlying logic is indicative of a cognitive specialism.  This approach led to a
Massively Modular Hypothesis [20] about cognitive organisation whereby there are
specific computations and stored representations for specific problems.
What EP is attempting to do is to show how evolutionary change has led to stable
modern order in Homo sapiens.  The central argument, that specific computational
devices were selected for, focuses upon adult end-state and has little to say about
ontogeny other than that ontogeny sees the coming on-line of these various
mechanisms over time [21].  Thus there are hardwired computational systems whose
successive staging is also hardwired.  This makes EP a nativist approach that fits well
with much contemporary developmentalism [3], but not with all.
3. Evolution and Development
It may be the case that evolution has selected for adult-end states that are modularly
organised, and that it has also selected for specific successive staging. But this
theoretical approach does not inform us about how such order emerges over
ontogenetic and phylogenetic time, nor does it inform us about how such progression
was selected for or why.
Recently a neo-constructivist view of development has emerged that takes a more
parsimonious view [8, 19].  The hypothesis is that the infant has a number of low-
level in-built systems.  From interactions between such systems themselves, and with
the environment, new behavioural capacities emerge in a principled manner. Where
EP argued for a stable EEA, neo-constructivism says that it is the very stability of the
environment, and low level cognitive architecture that allows the emergence of
higher order phenomena regularly during development.  Such neo-constructivist
development is likely to be adaptive and therefore selected for.
Karmiloff-Smith [11] terms this approach as emergent modularisation, arguing
that specific computational mechanisms for specific tasks will emerge as a part of
this process, but that they are not in-built.  The brain functionally organises itself as a
response to the activity it is involved in during development.  The brain is regarded
as sufficiently plastic to afford a number of ontogenetic trajectories. Karmiloff-Smith
suggests that "it is plausible that a fairly limited amount of innately specified,
domain-specific predispositions (which are not strictly modular) would be sufficient
to constrain the classes of inputs that the infant mind computes".
Karmiloff-Smith [12] has found support for this position in work on
developmental disorders.  Under the "traditional" view of development, disorders can
be viewed in terms of the failure of certain modules to either come on line, or to
operate properly once on line. There is no notion that this might affect the
developmental trajectories of the other extant modules.  Karmiloff-Smith has looked
at Williams Syndrome (WS).  People with WS have low IQ, deficits in spatio-
constructive skills, numerical cognition, and in problem solving. The evidence that
Karmiloff-Smith has presented suggests that deficits in certain cognitive domains
will affect the outcome of the rest of development.  For instance, WS people scored
in the same range as normal controls for face processing tasks.  However, the WS
participants solved the problems in a very different manner (componentially rather
than holistically).  Karmiloff-Smith argues that this is indicative of different
cognitive processes leading to the same behavioural outcomes.  This might be the
result of a process of modularisation affording the WS people a face processing
module, but it emerges from an atypical developmental trajectory. New order
emerges that satisfies certain functional demands in common with normal
development but this order is reached differently.
Underlying neo-constructivism is the older notion that the brain is a dynamic
system, consisting of certain variables that can interact in interestingly limited ways.
From this interaction order can emerge. Theorists have begun to model just such
development with some success [7].  For example, Mataric's robot exhibits wall
following equipped only with some sensors and basic pre-set movements that are
tripped by specific inputs [10].  It is the interaction of these simpler systems that
leads to the emergence of wall following and such systems are arguably coherent
natural kinds.
4. The Dynamical Hypothesis
What is the nature of the DH that underlies neoconstructivism?  Van Gelder [22] has
recently claimed that the DH "is the unifying essence of dynamical approaches to
cognition.  It is encapsulated in the simple slogan, cognitive agents are dynamical
systems". He further splits this into the knowledge hypothesis and the nature
hypothesis.  The latter is the claim that we are dynamical systems at the cognitive
level, consisting of a number of variables that interact with one another over time in
such a way as to exhibit self-organisation.  The knowledge hypothesis is the claim
that we can understand cognitive agents in dynamical terms.
The key characteristic of DH that is of interest to us is the move away from input-
output relations to a conception of ongoing and appropriate change.  Appropriate
change must be understood in relation to the adaptiveness of the system to its
ecological niche.  More generally, the idea that the system changes over time and is
the result of limited interactions between all of its variables and the environment -
that might consist of other systems - marks an important principle.  The question for
EP is now "how did such a dynamical system evolve in such a way as to ensure the
specific emergence of order that we see in ontogeny?"
5. What Changes During Evolution?
The preceding question does not assume that evolution has selected a "genetic
program" that generates a dynamic cognitive phenotype.  Traditional views of
evolution have it that order is generated through natural selection weeding out
adaptive variance. Kauffman [13] has noted that our notion of the genetic program
contains the idea of a sequential processor gradually unfolding standard
developmental trajectories by reading them off the genome. He has proposed that this
is not the case and that much of the order we see in biological systems has emerged
from the self-organising properties of "the genome".  It is only when self-organised
order has emerged that natural selection then has the opportunity to operate within
larger gene space. Biological development can be seen in these dynamical terms too.
Such a perspective makes for a better explanation of both the precision of
development and the ability of organisms to withstand (some) minor alterations
within the genome, as we see in the WS case which is caused by a chromosomal
micro-deletion.
Kauffman envisages the genome as a space where each gene can potentially
interact (epistasis) with other genes and in so doing affect the expression of the
phenotype "controlled" by that gene and the overall "shape" of the organism. Genes
are connected to other genes and become active (or inactive) when they receive
specified inputs.  The system shifts through various stages of activation. The number
of genes in this space is N and the number of potential interactions is K.  NK
modelling allows for the emergence of stable patterns of activity, or state cycles,
through the application of local rules within the network.  Kauffman's early models
were based on the observation that the human genome consists of around 100,000
genes but only 250 types of cell. Kauffman's intuition was that this observed pattern,
and a similar one in his simplified models, was indicative of state cycles.  It is the
mathematical properties of the genome that have determined the number and kinds of
cell types that there are - not natural selection.  Of course, this poses interesting
questions about the origin of these mathematical properties.
6. Where Are We?
Phenotypic stability can emerge from gene space and also from the dynamics of
development.  The phenotypic stability of evolutionary time scales is played out in a
large gene space and produces distinct species that stabilise in a particular region of
that space.  Within a given species, when we look up close in ontogenetic time, we
can see the emergence of phenotypic stability in terms of development of some
specific low level systems, and the emergence of subsequent systems as a result of
their interaction.  We now face the challenge of finding a methodology to
satisfactorily isolate and model the appropriate variables involved in such dynamics.
There is a further problem.  Development might be regarded as nested within
larger evolutionary processes but to some extent the opportunity for variance at the
developmental level in terms of structural morphology and from learnt behaviour
gives this system sufficient independence to potentially interact with and affect
evolutionary processes. This form of interaction, in which two systems
simultaneously alter each other's direction of change, is referred to as coupling [22].
Such coupling has arguably been demonstrated in discussion and simulations of
the Baldwin Effect [1].  Thus far in the discussion we have been conflating gene
space and phenotype space [16, 17, 18].  These are distinct spaces as natural selection
operates over phenotypes and genotypes simply code for phenotypes.  The Baldwin
Effect is about the relationship between these two spaces - if individuals have
sufficient phenotypic plasticity of the sort afforded by learning it is possible for them
to acquire new adaptive traits.  The individuals who are capable of doing this at low
cost are likely to be selected for.  Such learning can be characterised dynamically.
The initial consequence of such selection is that individuals capable of this form of
learning will dominate the population.  It is also argued that the corresponding
genotype for learners will be indirectly selected for.  It is possible that this trait may
eventually become genetically assimilated perhaps through the selection of faster and
faster learners [16, 17]. It is also possible that individuals will be selected for that
learn the trait so fast that it appears instinctive to external observers [9].  This will
still affect the available genotype.
With the Baldwin Effect we see an effect of learning upon phenotype and then
genotype.  This is undeniably an effect from learning through to evolution.
Potentially the alterations in genotype space will have generated other effects too as
the NK parameters are altered, this in turn might lead to changes in the nature of
relevant selection pressures that lead to selection of some ordered forms over others.
This has been recently discussed in relation to niche construction [14].  The ability to
build such things as dams, nests and burrows, for instance, are often learnt but might
enter genotype space at some point.  However, once the environment is substantially
altered then the selection pressure changes too. Darwin's own example is of
earthworms whose burrowing activities have radically altered the substructure of
much land [14].  This has led to changes in the amount of mucus produced and the
epidermal structure of earthworms.  It is possible that the emergence of human
culture might have wrought similar if not larger scale effects upon the evolution of
our cognition [14].
Evolution, development and learning are to some extent hierarchically ordered if
only in terms of time scales.  What they are not is a nested hierarchy with a
straightforward linear relationship.  Instead it would appear that there is good
argument for interactions between the systems.  This evidence does not force us to
abandon the role of natural selection, unfolding development or learning in our
models of behavioural science but it does suggest a more complex picture than that
which the input-output psychologists have painted.
7. Conclusion
The first two aims of this paper have been clearly met.  The unification afforded by
the DH is a result of taking seriously the self-organising aspects of the genome and
cognitive systems.  The potential for interaction between levels of explanation is a
consequence of each level being regarded as a system in its own right and potentially
open to coupling.
If we take the DH the job of cognitive science becomes one of finding out what
low-level systems have been selected for.  We have to try to understand how these
"natural kinds" might interact with one another within a relatively stable environment
to produce order over evolutionary time.  We also have to understand how this order
is able to develop over ontogenetic time and the levels and kinds of perturbation such
systems can tolerate.  Equally, we have to be aware of how learning can be
dynamically understood and emerge from described developmental trajectories.
Finally, we need to be aware of the potential role of Baldwin Effects in evolution as
well as the possibility of feedback from niche construction and other activities.
Presently, these DH inspired ideas provide an interesting framework to reconceive
data about development (and evolution) but the fine detail of such systems is
unknown.  It is at this point that modelling and simulation work must surely come
into their own.  Modellers must think about modelling the transition through
evolutionary, developmental and learning time.  In this way it might be possible to
construct parsimonious models of cognition and behaviour constituted by the order of
natural kind that Hendriks-Jansen finds so appealing.
We might recognise that cognitive developmental outcomes are dynamical and
influenced by evolution but to actually model the order of cognition discussed is not
easy.  The problem of Leibniz's Law potentially raises its head.  On the one hand, in
reducing input-output explanations or descriptions to a dynamical model we have to
be sure that we do not lose the point of initial reference, we have to be sure the
dynamical language refers to the same initial phenomena as the traditional language
did.  On the other, it might be that the DH forces us to radically reconceive our list of
natural cognitive kinds and to stop seeing them in the intentional and computational
manner that we currently do.  Thus computational accounts of input-output relations
might have set the initial question and the answer might deny that antecedent.
Indeed, the whole notion of input-output relations is questionable within the DH.
Despite the enormous difficulties of such modelling we feel that there is good
reason to conceive of organisms dynamically.  As the cognitive sciences are part of
the biological sciences they have an epistemological duty of coherence to conform to
biological theory.  If this is at the expense of traditional or Classicist [15], folk-theory
inspired conceptions of cognition, then so be it.
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